Russia’s War in Ukraine Has Brought Iran and Belarus Closer Together

Belarus and Iran have developed a growing strategic partnership since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. What began as a pragmatic association rooted in mutual economic and political isolation from the United States and its European allies has evolved into a more intimate relationship based on shared security concerns as well as rhetorical and material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Recent developments in joint defense production stand to enhance this bilateral relationship, while demonstrating how Russia integrates like-minded states into non-Western structures of partnership and allegiance. As the burgeoning security partnership between Belarus and Iran deepens, it could provide a secure flow of critical drone technology to Russian forces in Ukraine, with shorter supply lines and less vulnerable production sites. 

To prevent this critical enabler from developing further, the United States and its allies should take action. While economic sanctions on Belarus and Iran are crucial, additional steps are likely needed to impede the two countries’ support of Russia’s war effort. These measures include disrupting Iranian drone development and proliferation by interdicting shipments to Belarus as well as potentially threatening to strike drone production facilities within Iran. The United States and Europe should also continue providing Ukraine with military aid to counter the persistent threat posed by Iranian drones, while supporting Ukraine’s ability to advance its indigenous drone and air defense capabilities.  

A Growing Association

The partnership between Belarus and Iran has been many years in the making.

After efforts to normalize relations between Belarus and the European Union broke down in 1997 due to reported human rights violations, Belarus entered a period of relative diplomatic and economic isolation from Europe. Seeking new international partners, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko began courting Iran in the following year, visiting Tehran and establishing direct diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic — having previously used Kyiv as an intermediary. Iran was receptive to the outreach, and in 2004 then-president Mohammad Khatami visited Minsk and held bilateral talks on expanding commercial ties.

As regime hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in 2005, Iran adopted a “Look to the East” policy of strengthening ties with non-Western powers such as Russia and other states dissatisfied with what they perceived as an international order dominated by the United States. The policy signified a reversal of Khatami’s efforts to seek closer association with the West. Under this new approach, the relationship between Russia and Iran flourished. Meanwhile, cooperation between Tehran and Minsk tightened and became more overtly ideological, based on a shared animosity of the West as well as common concerns over political stability and regime survival.  

Following a 2007 summit, the two regimes formed a strategic partnership, granting Belarus access to Iranian oil while affirming Iran’s access to Belarusian nuclear expertise. Facing intensifying mutual isolation from the West, Belarus backed Iran’s nuclear ambitions based on the principle of the right to national self-determination. In return, Ahmadinejad promised to support Minsk’s opposition to what they perceived as U.S. attempts to maintain a unipolar world in which the dominant power exercised double standards in its relations with other countries. For his part, Lukashenko embraced the anti-West and particularly anti-U.S. rhetoric of the Islamic Republic, proclaiming that Iran and Belarus had the “will and strength” to oppose so-called “arrogant powers.” 

Despite the friendly rhetoric and shared national interests, the relationship between Tehran and Minsk reached a high-water mark under Ahmadinejad. With his successors, mutual support for shared “independent” policies and opposition to Western sanctions continued, accompanied by repeated pledges to bolster economic cooperation. Nevertheless, both regimes softened their rhetoric in the following years in pursuit of better relations with the West. Although these changes in tone were not reflected in meaningful reforms, they enabled Belarus to thaw ties with the European Union for brief periods in 2008 and 2015. Meanwhile, Iran successfully negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the United States, several European powers, Russia, and China (the United States subsequently withdrew from the pact in 2018). While bilateral trade between Belarus and Iran grew in the decades following Khatami’s initial visit — with new agreements frequently implemented — total volume remained relatively insignificant and was impeded by a lack of demand and now-lapsed United Nations sanctions.

The Emergence of Shared Security Interests

Iran and Belarus initially struggled to develop a significant military partnership in conjunction with their mutual diplomatic support and efforts to expand trade relations. Though Belarus reportedly transferred arms to Iran in early 2006, such activities were curtailed as the United Nations Security Council, including Russia, began to enforce arms embargoes on Iran in late 2006 and 2007. In the years following the implementation of the arms embargoes, Russia distanced itself from Iran on security issues, supporting further punitive measures by the United Nations in 2010. 

The Lukashenko regime made an abortive attempt to support research and development for the Iranian ballistic missile program in 2011, resulting in international sanctions against Belarus. As a result, efforts to form a military partnership with Iran based on the strategic partnership were abandoned, bringing Belarus into alignment with Russia’s posture toward the Islamic Republic. Ultimately, in the decade following the reported 2006 arms transfer, security cooperation between Iran and Belarus was limited to mutual support for the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War, though Belarusian involvement was minimal.

Military ties between Iran and Russia underwent a reversal toward direct collaboration in 2016, as their alignment in Syria intensified. That year, Iran also resumed open procurement of Russian arms following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. However, a similar change did not occur in Iranian-Belarusian relations. Rather, Minsk and Tehran remained focused on boosting economic ties and continuing to bolster diplomatic relations. In addition, Belarus emerged as a major arms supplier to Azerbaijan from 2018 to 2022. This supported Russia’s efforts to play both sides in the unresolved conflict between Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it placed Belarus at odds with Iran, which continued its longtime support for Armenia and opposition to external meddling in the South Caucasus.

The stale strategic partnership between Iran and Belarus was transformed into a more definitive military relationship through shared support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the beginning of the war, both regimes have emerged as two of Moscow’s staunchest partners, treating the United States and its European allies as shared adversaries. Belarus harbors Russian nuclear weapons, hosts military exercises on its territory, and has sent groups of migrants into E.U. territory as part of Russia’s so-called “hybrid warfare” strategy against the West. Iran, eager to expand its military reach and deepen ties with Russia, has provided it with weapons, including drones and ballistic missiles. While Belarus and Iran may have differing motivations for these moves, both countries have proven critical in sustaining the Russian war effort. Shared support for Russia has pushed Iran and Belarus to create a more meaningful security relationship, as shown by the exchange of military attachés for the first time, bilateral meetings between the Iranian and Belarusian general staff, invitation of Iranian observers to military exercises in Belarus, and the implementation of a more comprehensive memorandum of understanding on defense in 2023. Additionally, in 2022, Iran and Belarus became members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a loose security arrangement that includes Russia, China, India, and a number of Central Asian states. 

Furthermore, Russia has urged its friends to pursue economic integration as a geostrategic priority to challenge the power of the U.S. dollar and reduce the efficacy of Western-led international sanctions. As a result, Iran and Belarus have sought to revitalize their ineffectual trade relationship, with Russia facilitating this process. In 2024, Tehran and Minsk agreed to establish permanent trade offices to optimize the exchange of goods, and established a framework for trade using local currency rather than the dollar. Iran’s pending ratification of a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2025 is also expected to enhance commercial ties with Belarus, which is a member of the bloc. While these measures will not radically alter the economic position of either regime, they demonstrate the extent to which relations between Iran and Belarus have shifted dramatically in recent years, within a broader Russian-led international framework.

Cooperation on Defense Production

The most consequential element of the deepening partnership between Iran and Belarus is nascent cooperation on defense production. Factors including Iran’s strategic considerations and Russia’s continued influence over both Tehran and Minsk are creating the conditions to produce Iranian drones on Belarusian soil, offering clear battlefield advantages for Russia’s war effort.

In April 2024, Ukrainian forces struck the only confirmed site where Iranian-designed drones are produced in Russia. With the United States lifting its ban against Ukrainian strikes on targets inside Russia using U.S. missiles, Moscow’s supply chains may be even more at risk. Even if a production site lies outside of striking distance, the drones remain vulnerable while in transit or cached. Key transfer points for drones coming directly from Iran are also at high risk of missile attack. In the long term, such factors could ramp up pressure on Russia to diversify its supply chains and defense production. Iran’s acceleration of plans to produce drones in the Gomel region in southeastern Belarus, bordering both Ukraine and Russia, would be an ideal solution for Russia. This would decrease the time from production to deployment, shorten supply chains, and shield production sites from Ukrainian attacks. At present, the Ukrainian government does not consider Belarus a combatant in the war with Russia.

For its part, Belarus has sought to produce Iranian military technology domestically over the past two years. Producing Iranian drones could allow Minsk to profit off the surging global demand for Iranian-designed hardware, and an opportunity to rectify its own defense inadequacies. Furthermore, producing the Shahed-136 drone and providing them to Russia would offset pressure for Belarus to send troops into Ukraine – a demand Putin may be hesitant to make due to the potential for blowback by the Belarusian public against Lukashenko.

The 2023 bilateral defense memorandum between Belarus and Iran reportedly included provisions for the former to begin producing the Shahed-136, the model of drone that has been critical to Russia’s battlefield capabilities in Ukraine. In July 2024, Belarusian military officials unveiled Kochyovnyk – an ostensibly locally designed drone strikingly similar to the Shahed-136. The Ukrainian government reported that, in fact, Belarusian factories were simply repainting drones produced elsewhere. Currently, there is no conclusive evidence that Belarus is independently producing the Iranian drone technology. It appears Iran has stalled the process of outsourcing production since 2023, sending only one confirmed delegation of engineers to assess production sites.

Iran’s calculus on outsourcing drone production has been more complicated. On the one hand, such measures could extend the country’s reach as a major global arms producer. Since 2022, Iranian technology has become integral not only for Russia’s military, but those of other friends, including Sudan, Venezuela, and Ethiopia. Iran has already used outsourced production as a means of expanding exports, as demonstrated by its decision to open a drone factory in Tajikistan in the summer of 2022. On the other hand, Iran likely stalled plans to initiate production in Belarus out of concerns that it could diminish Tehran’s leverage with Moscow or throw a wrench in its pursuit of sanctions relief.

However, Iran’s strategic considerations are in flux, as its network of partners and proxies has begun to unravel. In particular, Hizbollah’s weakening in its conflict with Israel, the collapse of Syria’s Assad regime, and expectation that the United States will return to a “maximum pressure” approach toward Iran have given the latter the impetus for strategic recalibration. With a shifting posture, Iran will likely see it necessary to further align its interests with Russia, one of its few remaining partners. This is perhaps best shown by its recent partnership agreement with Russia, which includes provisions for security and intelligence cooperation. Under the agreement, Russia may pressure Iran to accelerate the production of drones in Belarus. Russia could offer other incentives, like an expansion to the North-South Transport Corridor, accelerating the sluggish delivery of Russian aircraft, or allowing Iran to produce additional Russian hardware.

As a result of these considerations, there has been recent movement on the issue of joint production. In November 2024, a high ranking Belarusian military delegation visited an Iranian defense staff university involved in drone research and development. Further military engagement between Tehran and Minsk is expected this year. 

Potential Western Reactions

To oppose the growing partnership between Iran and Belarus, the United States and its allies should counter Moscow’s overtures with adequate deterrence. Though economic sanctions have succeeded in preventing the involvement of some third-party states, they have not stopped Iran and Belarus from enabling Russia’s war. Moscow’s efforts to promote economic integration between its partners will also likely enhance resilience against sanctions, even if the economies of Russia’s close associates remain beset by significant challenges. 

Even given these considerations, sanctions remain an important tool of deterrence, particularly by working to deny Iran and Belarus key resources and financial assets. There is also room for improvement with sanctions enforcement, by closing loopholes and ensuring that violations do not go unchecked. Ultimately, sanctions are only one tool that should be used to complement a broader strategy focused on disrupting collaboration between Iran, Belarus, and Russia.

Beyond sanctions, the clearest way to deter Belarusian production of Iranian drone technology would be for Ukraine to threaten Belarus with retaliation against production sites, as it has done in Russia. Ukraine has already issued similar warnings to Belarus against amassing forces on the border, and has made clear its conditions for defensive strikes, which can be broadened. These actions should be taken in conjunction with efforts to assist the Belarusian people in resisting the Lukashenko regime, by rescinding international recognition of his presidency and supporting activism among non-governmental organizations and the Belarusian diaspora.

Adequately deterring Iran will require further actions by the United States to disrupt its drone development and proliferation efforts, by interdicting shipments where possible, imposing sanctions on third-party states that import Iranian drone technology, and by pressuring its European partners to scrap ongoing talks with Tehran. In conjunction with a renewed “maximum pressure” campaign, the Trump administration may seek to directly threaten Iranian drone production sites with kinetic strikes if the technology is further used to attack U.S. military personnel. This would not be wholly unprecedented. In February 2024, the Biden administration authorized strikes against Iranian forces in Iraq and Syria in response to an attack using an Iranian-produced drone that killed three U.S. servicemembers in Jordan. Furthermore, Trump has reportedly begun a review of U.S. military strike options against Iran, indicating he may see this as a plausible course of action. 

The United States and its allies should also diminish the efficacy of Iranian drone technology on the battlefield by strengthening Ukraine’s hand. This can be done in two ways. First, by providing more ground and air-based interference systems to enhance Ukraine’s electronic warfare capabilities and disable drones under Russian control. As of December 2024, Ukrainian forces have effectively used “spoofing” tactics to successfully repel or redirect drone attacks. Second, by providing increased intelligence support and additional fighter aircraft, in conjunction with recent efforts by Denmark and France. Washington may also wish to supply additional air defense missiles, which Ukraine has gone through quickly in response to persistent Russian air operations. 

Additionally, the United States should assist in Ukraine’s own drone innovation efforts. The $800 million that Washington agreed to provide in October 2024 to produce attack drones was a step in the right direction, but the United States should consider directly contributing to Ukrainian efforts to develop AI-enabled first-person view drones, among other defense technology initiatives. 

The threat posed by cooperation on defense production between Iran and Belarus underscores the importance of continued material support for Kyiv from both Europe and the United States. Countering cooperation between these two regimes will require an intensification of diplomatic pressure, in conjunction with new efforts to enhance Western-led deterrence. With shifting strategic considerations, what began as a pragmatic relationship based on shared animosity toward and isolation from the West has evolved into a consequential international challenge, revealing the increasingly significant role of a Russian-led “multi-pariah order.”

Jack Roush is a doctoral candidate affiliated with the Iranian History Initiative at the London School of Economics, and a research associate at United Against Nuclear Iran. Find him on X @RoushJackW.

Image: khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons