This article is part of a collection on the second-term president’s approach to the world. Read the full package here.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s fixation on mass deportations in his first 100 days has flung Latin America up the foreign-policy priority list. Under other circumstances, that attention might be celebrated. After all, it’s rare that a U.S. secretary of state makes their first international trip to the region, as Marco Rubio did in February when he visited Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.
But one of Rubio’s goals on that trip was to lay the groundwork for deportations to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador. The United States later transferred migrants there, alleging that they were gang members, even though most had no criminal records in the United States and appeared to be accused based on little more than their tattoos.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s fixation on mass deportations in his first 100 days has flung Latin America up the foreign-policy priority list. Under other circumstances, that attention might be celebrated. After all, it’s rare that a U.S. secretary of state makes their first international trip to the region, as Marco Rubio did in February when he visited Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.
But one of Rubio’s goals on that trip was to lay the groundwork for deportations to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador. The United States later transferred migrants there, alleging that they were gang members, even though most had no criminal records in the United States and appeared to be accused based on little more than their tattoos.
Despite the indiscriminate nature of these deportations, many Latin American leaders are facilitating them—and not only those who seek a close relationship with Trump. This in part continues a trend of regional governments emulating the United States’ restrictive immigration policies. It also reflects that Latin American governments want to preserve their political capital for countering another of Trump’s policies: economic pressure.
Trump quickly threatened 25 percent tariffs on Mexico, only partially backing down after major concessions. In Panama, Trump coupled warnings about economic engagement with China with threats to take over critical infrastructure. And though Rubio has said he wants joint economic prosperity in the Western Hemisphere, few details have emerged about a positive economic agenda for the region.
The United States is more important for total trade and investment in Central America and Mexico than in South America, where China accounts for more of the economic pie. Trump’s pressure on Latin America to shun relations with China is familiar; but during his first term, many South American countries rejected that pressure and even doubled down on economic ties with Beijing.
In the face of Trump’s dramatic new trade barriers, Latin American countries are getting more creative. The Mercosur trade bloc has moved closer to a long-stalled trade agreement with the European Union; even Mexico City is in trade talks with Brussels. Presidents from the region were feted with state visits in India and Japan in recent weeks. So far, at least one effect of Trump’s second term has been to inspire countries toward trade diversification.